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Abstract
Our objective in this paper is to show, by adopting a life-cycle un-
employment equilibrium approach, that labor market institutions such
as unemployment benefits, employment protection and mandatory re-
tirement age have an age-differentiated impact which can explain age-
differentiated employment gaps between the US and French economies.
Whereas the employment rates are quite similar for middle-aged work-
ers, weaker rotations on the labor market lead to lower employment
rates for younger workers. Moreover, the closer to 60 the retirement
age, the lower the employment rate for workers aged between 50 and
59.
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1 Introduction
National labor market performance is traditionally assessed by considering
specific institutions such as employment protection (Blanchard and Portugal
[2001]), unemployment insurance (Ljungqvist and Sargent [2004]) or tax sys-
tems and government (Prescott [2004], Rogerson [2006]). Until recently, all
these studies have not recognized employment differences by age as central.
This is quite surprising as policy makers are well aware that the employ-
ment differences across countries are centered at the extremity of the work-
ing life cycle. Recently, Prescott, Rogerson and Wallenius [2009] and Kitao,
Ljungqvist and Sargent [2008] have acknowledged that any quantitative anal-
ysis of transatlantic differences in the labor market must seriously take this
issue into account. Additionally, using a sample of 20 OECD countries, Bas-
sanini and Duval (2006) show that the impact of the Social Security rules
(implicit taxes on continued work, and the standard age of entitlement to
old-age pension benefits) significantly decrease the employment rate of the
55-64 age group. They also note that these workers are more sensitive to
the employment protection. Finally, concerning the employment rate of the
20-24 age group, their estimates suggest that young workers are more sen-
sitive to unemployment benefits and employment protection than prime-age
workers.
Our objective in this paper is to show, by adopting a life-cycle unemploy-
ment equilibrium approach, originally developed in Chéron, Hairault and
Langot [2008a], that the labor market institutions have an age-differentiated
impact which can explain age-differentiated employment gaps between coun-
tries. The starting point of our study relies on the following set of styl-
ized facts, focusing more particularly on a transatlantic comparison between
France and the US:
• Fact 1: The age-dynamic of employment is hump-shaped (Figure 1)
• Fact 2: The age-dynamic of labor market flows are characterized by
(i) U-shaped inflow rates to unemployment (firing rates1), and (ii) age-
decreasing hiring rates (Figure 1).
1As is usual, we refer to firings even though we consider all the separations.
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Figure 1: France and US labor market statistics by age-group (1997-2003)
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Figure 2: The gap in employment rates between France and the US from the
1970s to 1990s
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• Fact 3: Whatever the decade, the employment rates of prime age
workers are approximately the same in France as in the US. On the
other hand, the gap for the younger (under 25) and the older (over 55)
workers has risen considerably (see Figure 2).
In this paper, we investigate the age-differentiated effects on labor market
flows, hence on employment rates, of labor market institutions such as un-
employment benefits, employment protection and the mandatory retirement
age. As we have observed changes in those institution in France, this could
explain why the employment gap for the younger and the older workers with
respect to the US has sharply increased.
Figure 3: Effective retirement ages and replacement ratios in France and the
US
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Figure 3, left panel, shows the changes in the effective retirement age (RA)
in France and in the US: the gap has increased continuously to reach around
five years in the mid-nineties. Similarly, the gap between the unemployment
replacement ratios is twice as high at the end of the sample than at the
beginning (Figure 3, right panel). Finally, France has also experimented with
increasingly strict employment protection, whereas employment protection
legislation (EPL) is quasi absent in the US.
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This paper primarily argues that these changes in institutions have a
strong age-differentiated impact on firings and hirings, hence on life-cycle
employment rates. So, we consider the job creation-job destruction approach
to the labor market with a deterministic retirement age. This framework,
which is an extension of Mortensen and Pissarides [1994] to a life-cycle ap-
proach, has been analyzed in Chéron, Hairault and Langot [2008a]. It implies
that the firing (hiring) rate increases (decreases) with the age of the worker,
because the time over which to recoup adjustment costs is decreasing when
the worker gets closer to the retirement age. Otherwise stated, because the
horizon of older workers is shorter, firms invest less in labor-hoarding activ-
ities at the end of the life cycle. This implies that the employment rate is
falling at the end of the life-cycle, before the retirement age. Moreover, since
it takes time to find a job, a lower employment rate for young workers arises
from a queue phenomenon. The model we consider also takes into account
exogenous specific human capital accumulation which raises the productivity
of the job-worker pair. This increases the separation rate of younger workers
who have on average a lower amount of specific human capital. The overall
hump-shaped age-dynamic of employment rates is then well reproduced.
As a preliminary step, we provide some analytical results which allow
us to emphasize the age-differentiated effects of the unemployment benefits,
the firing tax and the retirement age. We then turn to the quantitative
investigation, by first calibrating the model on the US economy over the
period 1997-2003. We show that the model is able to match the observed
age profile of both the employment rate and the hiring and the separation
rates. We then propose a first counterfactual experiment which consists of
considering the French institutions in this calibrated model: if the predictions
of the model fitted the stylized facts about the French labor market, then
differences in the unemployment replacement rate, the firing costs and the
retirement age would be sufficient to explain the transatlantic gap in labor
market performance. We show that the lower retirement age combined with
high unemployment benefits in France account for all the employment gap of
the 55-59 age-group. For the younger workers, the introduction of a “welfare
state” explains a significant part of the lower rotations in France, and then of
the lower employment rate for the 16-24 age-group, but it is not sufficient to
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account for the low level of the employment rate observed at the beginning of
the 2000s in France. In a second counterfactual experiment, we show that the
changes in these institutions that arose between 1970 and 2000 can account
for much of the modification of the transatlantic employment gap.
Section 2 presents the theoretical framework. Its theoretical properties
on the age-differentiated impact of the labor market institutions are analyzed
in Section 3. The empirical assessment of the model is provided in Section
4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
We consider the life-cycle matching model developed in Chéron, Hairault and
Langot [2008a]. Moreover, we assume the existence of a learning-by-doing
process which improves the productivity of a specific match. An unemploy-
ment episode leads to a complete depreciation of this “specific” human cap-
ital. We also consider a version of this model with unemployment benefits
and employment protection.
2.1 Assumptions
The model is in discrete time with T the deterministic retirement date. At
each period the older worker generation retiring from the labor market is
replaced by a younger worker generation of the same size. The worker’s age
is perfectly known by employers. New workers start in the labor market as
unemployed.
2.1.1 Idiosyncratic productivity and human capital accumulation
Firms are small and each has one job. The destruction flows derive from
idiosyncratic productivity shocks that hit the jobs at random. Once a shock
arrives, the firm has no choice but either to continue production or to de-
stroy the job. Then, for age i ∈ (2, T − 1), employed workers are faced with
layoffs when their job becomes unprofitable. At the beginning of each age,
a job productivity ² is drawn in the general distribution G(²) with ² ∈ [0, ²].
The firms decide to close down any jobs whose productivity is below an (en-
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dogenous) productivity threshold (productivity reservation) denoted Ri. Job
creation takes place when a firm and a worker meet. The flow of newly cre-
ated jobs result from a matching function, the inputs of which are vacancies
and unemployed workers. This flow also depends on productivity thresholds
R0i because it is assumed that productivity values ² are known after firm and
worker have met.
The overall productivity of the job is hj² with hj+1 ≥ hj, where j denotes
the seniority. This human capital is job-specific: after an unemployment
episode, the worker is at the minimal level of human capital, h0.
2.1.2 Worker flows with non age-directed search
We assume that firms cannot ex-ante age-direct their search: there is a unique
labor market tightness. The matching function, increasing in both its argu-
ments and with constant returns-to-scale is defined by:
M =M(v,
∑
i
eiui)
Let θ = v∑
i eiui
denote the tightness of the labor market. It is then straightfor-
ward to define the probability for unemployed workers of age i to be employed
at age i + 1, as jci ≡ eip(θ)[1 − G(R0i+1)] with p(θ) = M(u,v)u . Similarly, we
define the job destruction rate for an employed worker of age i and seniority
j as jdji = G(R
j
i ).
Let nji be the level of employment for workers of age i and seniority j.
ni =
∑i−1
j=0 n
j
i is the employment rate for workers of age i. The changes in
employment according to workers’ age can be stated as follows:
nj+1i+1 = n
j
i [1−G(Rj+1i+1 )] ∀j ≥ 0, i ≥ 1
n0i+1 = uieip(θ)[1−G(R0i+1)]
In turn, the age-dynamic of unemployment solves:
ui+1 = ui
(
1− eip(θ)[1−G(R0i+1)]
)
+
i−1∑
j=0
njiG(R
j+1
i+1 )
for a given initial condition u1 = 1.
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2.2 Job value
The expected values of a filled job by a worker of age i are defined by:
J ji (²) = hj²− wji (²) + β
∫ ²
Rj+1i+1
J j+1i+1 (x)dG(x) + βG(R
j+1
i+1 ) (V − F )
with wji (²) the wage of a worker of age i and tenure j. F denotes a firing
cost that refers to the costs implicit in mandated employment protection
legislation.
2.3 Hiring policy
Any firm is free to open a job vacancy and engage in hiring. c denotes the
flow cost of recruiting a worker and β ∈ [0, 1] the discount factor. Let V be
the expected value of a vacant position, q(θ) the firm’s probability of meeting
a worker and J0i (²) the initial value of a filled job with productivity ²:
V = −c+ βq(θ)
T−1∑
i=1
[
ui
u
(∫ ²
R0i+1
J0i+1(x)dG(x) +G(R
0
i+1)V
)]
+β(1− q(θ))V
Vacancies are determined according to the expected value of a contact with
an unemployed worker. The expected value of a contact with an unemployed
worker depends on the age distribution of the unemployed workers. Typically,
the more older unemployed workers there are in the economy, the less is the
expected return on a vacancy. This feature implies intergenerational exter-
nalities in the search process which leads to dismissing the Hosios condition
as a first best requirement2.
The free-entry condition (V = 0) yields to:
c
q(θ)︸︷︷︸
hiring
cost
= β
T−1∑
i=1
ui
u
∫ ²
R0i+1
J0i+1(x)dG(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
value of a job
for age i
2See Chéron, Hairault and Langot [2008a] for a more detailed discussion on the ineffi-
ciency of the decentralized equilibrium.
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2.4 Firing policy
The firm’s optimal choice is to not create (destroy) a job when its value falls
below zero (the firing cost), that is:
J0i (²) < 0 J
j
i (²) < −F
This leads to reservation productivity levels R0i and R
j
i that solve:
J0i (R
0
i ) = 0 and J
j
i (R
j
i ) = −F ∀i, j ≥ 1
R0i determines the set of new jobs, whereas R
j
i gives the set of fired workers
of age i with the tenure j. The productivity threshold Rji is given by:
hjR
j
i = w
j
i (Ri)︸ ︷︷ ︸
labor
cost
− F︸︷︷︸
current
firing
cost
+ βG(Rj+1i+1 )F︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected
firing cost
− β
∫ ²
Rj+1i+1
J j+1i+1 (x)dG(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected
surplus
The higher the wage, the higher the reservation productivity, and hence
the higher the job destruction flows. On the other hand, the higher the option
value of filled jobs (the expected surplus in the future), the weaker the job
destructions. Because the job value vanishes at the end of the working life,
labor hoarding of older workers is less profitable. On the other hand, the
firing costs are particularly efficient for the employment of older workers3.
Older workers also benefit from their higher level of human capital on average.
These last two effects can offset the horizon effect.
The productivity threshold for the hirings is given by:
h0R
0
i = w
0
i (R
0
i )︸ ︷︷ ︸
labor
cost
+ βG(R1i+1)F︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected
firing cost
− β
∫ ²
R1i+1
J1i+1(x)dG(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected
surplus
Job creations decrease with age as the expected surplus is reduced by the
proximity to retirement. Regarding hirings, there is no protection for human
capital or from firing costs.
3This point is more particularly analyzed in Chéron, Hairault and Langot [2008b].
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2.5 Search effort
Making the search effort endogenous reinforces the decrease in the employ-
ment rate at the end of working life, as is shown in Ljungqvist ad Sargent
[2008] and Hairault, Langot and Sopraseuth [2010]. As the retirement age
gets closer, the return on job-search investments decreases because the hori-
zon (the expected job duration) over which workers can recoup their invest-
ment is reduced. The endogenous search effort is derived from the following
intertemporal problem:
Ui = max
ei
{b+ z − φ(ei) + β [(1− eip(θ))Ui+1
+eip(θ)
(∫ ²
R0i+1
W0i+1(x)dG(x) +G(R0i+1)Ui+1
)]}
The optimal search intensity satisfies
φ′(ei) = βp(θ)
∫ ²
R0i+1
[W0i+1 − Ui+1](x)dG(x)
For a given R0i+1, ei decreases with age as W0i+1 − Ui+1 decreases with age
according to the worker’s horizon effect. For a givenW0i+1−Ui+1, ei decreases
because R0i+1 increases according to the firm’s horizon effect.
2.6 Wage bargaining
The rent associated with a job is divided between the employer and the
worker according to a wage rule. Following the most common specification,
wages are determined by the Nash solution to a bargaining problem4. The
bargaining power of the workers is considered as constant across ages. The
global surplus generated by a job is divided according to a sharing rule ac-
cording to a two-tier wage structure. We have the two following sharing
rules which determine the wage w0i (²) of the newly hired workers and the
wage wji (²) of the workers of tenure j respectively:
W0i (²)− Ui = γ
[
J0i (²) +Wi(²)− Ui
]
Wji (²)− Ui = γ
[
J ji (²)− (V − F ) +Wji (²)− Ui
]
4This wage setting rule has been somewhat disputed (See for instance Shimer [2005].
We leave the exploration of alternative wage rules to future research.
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Equations for the initial and subsequent wages are given by:
w0i (²) = (1− γ)(b+ z − φ(ei))
+γ
(
h0²+ βeip(θ)
∫ ²
R0i+1
J0i+1(x)dG(x)− βF
)
wji (²) = (1− γ)(b+ z − φ(ei))
+γ
(
hj²+ βeip(θ)
∫ ²
R0i+1
J ji+1(x)dG(x) + (1− β)F
)
Let τi denote the relative job value of age i to the average job value:
τi ≡
∫ ²
R0i+1
J0i+1(x)dx∑T−1
i=1
(
ui
u
∫ ²
R0i+1
J0i+1(x)dx
) with { τ1 > 1
τT−1 < 1
The wage equations can be rewritten as follows:
w0i (²) = (1− γ)(b+ z − φ(ei)) + γ (h0²+ cθτi − βF )
wji (²) = (1− γ)(b+ z − φ(ei)) + γ (hj²+ cθτi + (1− β)F )
It is worth emphasizing that the way market tightness enters the wage equa-
tion in our model depends on the worker’s age through the variable τi. This
variable gives the value of a worker hired at age i relative to the expected
value of a job according to the age distribution of unemployed workers5. τi
decreases with age. This implies that the bargaining strength of a young
worker is greater than that of an old worker, and, consequently, for a given
productivity level ², that the wage is lower for a worker of age i+1 than for a
worker of age i, wi+1(²) ≤ wi(²). Ultimately, we have wT−1(²) = γ²+(1−γ)b.
5So that we typically have τ1 > 1 for the youngest workers and τT−1 < 1 for the oldest
ones, or more generally τi+1 ≤ τi.
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2.7 Equilibrium
A labor market equilibrium with wage bargaining exists and it is character-
ized by6:
c
q(θ)
= β(1− γ)
∑
i
[
ui
u
(
h0
∫ ²
R0i+1
[1−G(x)]dx
)]
R0i = b+ z − φ(ei) + βF − βh1
∫ ²
R1i+1
[1−G(x)]dx
+γβeip(θ)h0
∫ ²
R0i+1
[1−G(x)]dx
hjR
j
i = b+ z − φ(ei)− (1− β)F − βhj+1
∫ ²
Rj+1i+1
[1−G(x)]dx
+γβeip(θ)h0
∫ ²
R0i+1
[1−G(x)]dx
φ′(ei) = γβp(θ)h0
∫ ²
R0i+1
[1−G(x)]dx
nj+1i+1 = n
j
i [1−G(Rj+1i+1 )] ∀j ≥ 0, i ≥ 1
n0i+1 = uieip(θ)[1−G(R0i+1)]
ui+1 = ui
(
1− p(θ)[1−G(R0i+1)]
)
+
i−1∑
j=0
njiG(R
j+1
i+1 )
with terminal conditions hjT−1R
j
T−1 = b − F , R0T−1 = b, and a given initial
condition u1.
3 Theoretical properties
We now address the issue of the relationship between labor market institu-
tions and the age-dynamics of employment. For simplicity, the results are
derived without human capital accumulation, that is hj = hj+1 = 1, ∀j. We
investigate the properties of two different economies:
• The first economy is characterized by no employment protection (F =
6Note that Jji = (1− γ)hj
∫ ²
Rji+1
[1−G(x)]dx.
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0), low unemployment benefits denoted b, and a high retirement age T .
This economy is called a laissez-faire economy.
• The second economy is characterized by the existence of employment
protection and high unemployment benefits such that F > 0 and b > b,
and a shorter retirement age T < T . This shorter retirement age can
be interpreted as a higher tax on continued activity. This economy is
called a welfare-state economy.
Our goal is then to show how these different institutions can be consistent
with identical employment rates for middle-aged workers, but lower employ-
ment rates for the young worker and for the seniors in the second economy
than in the first economy.
3.1 The impact of labor market institutions on the em-
ployment of younger workers
In order to focus only on the dynamic of younger worker employment,
let us assume that the first cohort of the economy has an infinite lifetime
(T → ∞). In this case, Ri jumps instantaneously to its stationary value
R?. Indeed, as the dynamic of Ri is stable backward, Ri = R? is the unique
value of Ri on the saddle path (see Figure 4). Let us consider the following
equations at the steady state:
R? = b+ z − φ(e?)− (1− β)F − β
∫ ²
R?
[1−G(x)]dx
+γβe?p(θ)
∫ ²
R0
[1−G(x)]dx
R0 = R? + F
φ′(e?) = γβp(θ)
∫ ²
R0
[1−G(x)]dx
These equations allow us to find the reservation productivity as a function
of the labor market policies: R? = R(b, F ). We then deduce the job cre-
ation and the job destruction rates JCrate(b, F ) and JDrate(b, F ). Hence,
when T →∞, the age-dynamic employment can be reduced to the following
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Figure 4: Equilibrium dynamics of {Ri, ni}
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R(i) 
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equation:
ni = [1− JCrate(b, F )− JDrate(b, F )]ni−1 + JCrate(b, F )
with
{
JCrate(b, F ) = e?p(θ)[1−G(R? + F )]
JDrate(b, F ) = G(R?)
given the initial condition n1. This equation describes the transitional path
of younger worker employment until convergence to an age-stationary level,
denoted by n?.
It is then possible to show how differences in labor market institutions can
be consistent with identical age-stationary employment rates, but lower em-
ployment rates for the younger workers in the welfare-state economy. Starting
with the initial condition n1, the transitional age-dynamics of employment
are characterized by the speed of adjustment to reach the age-stationary
employment rate. Since the labor market tightness and the reservation pro-
ductivity are not age-dependent when T →∞, we thus have a constant speed
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of adjustment from n1 to n?. This speed of adjustment is defined by:∣∣∣∣∂∆ni∂ni−1
∣∣∣∣ = { JCrate(b, F ) + JDrate(b, F ) ≡ µ(b, F ) ⇐⇒ welfare stateJCrate(b, 0) + JDrate(b, 0) ≡ µ(b, 0) ⇐⇒ laissez-faire
For a given level of b, there exist b and F such that JDrate(b, 0) = x ×
JDrate(b, F ) and JCrate(b, 0) = x × JCrate(b, F ) with x > 1. These par-
ticular values for b and F may imply the same age-stationary employment
rate, n?, in the two economies. However, it is obvious that the age-dynamics
of employment to reach n? take more time in the welfare state economy than
in the laissez-faire: µ(b, 0) = x × µ(b, F ) > µ(b, F ). Lower job flows con-
tribute to increasing the younger workers’ employment rate.
Clearly, starting with the same initial condition n1 = 0, an economy with
higher rotations leads to a faster increase in employment: the employment
rate of younger workers converges more quickly toward the age-stationary
employment rate.
For T finite but high enough, the results are qualitatively the same. Al-
though Ri does not jump to its age-stationary value, we have the fact that
Ri → R?, at the beginning of the life cycle for T sufficiently large. Then,
the age-dynamics of employment are approximately the same for younger
workers as obtained when T → ∞. This reflects the fact that the terminal
condition only has a significant impact on the age-dynamics of older worker
employment.
3.2 The impact of the finite life-time assumption on the
older workers
Turning to the issue of older worker employment, the key parameter of
the model is the retirement age. The age profile of hirings and firings has
been recursively determined from terminal conditions. On the other hand,
the age profile of unemployment ui (or employment ni = 1− ui) depends on
the arbitrary initial condition u1. Then we have:
ui+1 = ui [1− eip(θ)(1−G(Ri+1))] +G(Ri+1)(1− ui)
⇔ ui+1 − ui = G(Ri+1)− ui [eip(θ)(1−G(Ri+1)) +G(Ri+1)]
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implying that
ui ≷
G(Ri+1)
G(Ri+1) + eip(θ)(1−G(Ri+1)) ⇒ ni+1 ≷ ni ∀i
For u1 = 1, Chéron, Hairault and Langot [2008a] show that there exists a
Figure 5: Equilibrium dynamics of {Ri, ni}
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threshold age T˜ such that ni ≥ ni−1 ∀i ≤ T˜ and ni ≤ ni−1 ∀i ≥ T˜ (see
Figure 5). Until the age T˜ , the increase in the employment rate is the result
of a queue phenomenon: at the age of entry on the labor market, there are
only few firings, whereas hirings are greater. From T˜ onwards, the hiring rate
declines whereas the destruction rate increases, leading to lower employment
rates for older workers.
The definition of the equilibrium emphasizes that we have the same ter-
minal condition whatever the value of T : for two retirement ages, namely
T = T and T = T +N , we have RT−1 = RT+N−1 = b−F . Then, from back-
ward induction, RT−1−i = RT+N−1−i ∀i. It appears that age in itself does
not matter for these equilibrium dynamics. Only the distance to this retire-
ment age is of interest. This suggests that the predicted decrease (increase)
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with age in the job finding rate (reservation productivity) occurs sooner in
economies where the retirement age is lower.
4 Empirical assessment
In this section, we consider the US economy which is certainly the closest one
to our streamlined laissez-faire economy, whereas France can be considered
as representative of the welfare-state economy. We consider the flows onto
the labor market for different ages. We then compute the annual hiring rate
of non employed workers and the annual separation rate of employed workers
for different categories of age from the CPS and from the “Enquete Emploi”
over the period 1997-2003. We consider only men. We observe that the de-
struction rates are U-shaped and the creation rates are decreasing with age,
both in the US and in the French data (see Figure 1 in the introduction). Is
the model able to replicate such flows as an implication of country-specific
labor market institutions, such as unemployment benefits, employment pro-
tection and the retirement age? Do observed changes in these labor market
institutions explain the change in the employment gap between France and
the US? This section seeks to give some quantitative answers to these ques-
tions.
4.1 Calibration
We propose to clarify the calibration strategy by distinguishing parameters
calibrated on external information and parameters calibrated in order to
make the model consistent with empirical counterparts. We calibrate our
model on US data. In order to use the employment rates by age as over-
identifying restrictions, our strategy is to use as much external information
as possible, such as for the bargaining power, the elasticity of the matching
function and the discount factor: γ = ψ = 0.5 and β = 0.96 (Mortensen and
Pissarides [1999]).
The other parameters are calibrated in order to match observed targets:
• The dynamic of the human capital accumulation is assumed to be gov-
erned by the process: hj = α0 + α1 × j + α1 × j2. The human capital
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accumulation is calibrated in order to match the return on 10 years of
tenure (see Altonji and Williams [2005])
• The recruiting cost c is set in order to match the estimates of Abowd
and Kramarz (2003).
• In the 2000s, the US institutions are calibrated in the following way:
– Unemployment benefits z are chosen in order to match the ob-
served average replacement rate 0.12.
– The firing costs F are equal to 0.
– This retirement age is set at 64.
We assume that the home production is specific to each country {bUS, bFR}.
Then, given that the disutility of the search effort has the following functional
form, φ(ei) = χ
(
e1+νi
1+ν
)
, it remains to calibrate the 4 parameters, {χ, ν} and
{bUS, bFR}. As our analysis is focused on the implications of our model at
the beginning and at the end of the life cycle, they are calibrated in order
to match the employment rate and the separation rate of the middle-aged
workers in the US and in France at the beginning of the 2000s.
4.2 A first assessment on the US economy
Considering the US economy, our calibration strategy implies that the model
matches the employment and the separation rate of the workers aged 30-
49. The key issue about the empirical relevance of our model then relies
on its ability to account for job creation and job destruction flows for both
younger and older workers. Simulation results are plotted in Figure 6. Firstly,
they show that our model is able to account both for lower younger and
older employment rates in the US. Secondly, Figure 6 shows that our model
matches quite well the age-pattern of separation and hiring rates over the
life cycle. The introduction of human capital accumulation allows us to
reproduce the U-shaped age-dynamic in the separation rate: at the beginning
of the life-cycle, the average level of human capital of the employed workers
is low, implying that the jobs are sensitive to idiosyncratic shocks. Because
experience increases with the age of the worker, the worker productivity
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Figure 6: Model Assessment: US - 2000
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increases with age, leading jobs to be more immune to productivity shocks
when occupied by middle-aged workers. But, at the end of the life-cycle, this
higher productivity is overcompensated by the “horizon effect”: the older
workers are more sensitive to idiosyncratic shocks because labor hoarding is
less profitable just before retirement.
However, it must be acknowledged that the flow levels are not perfectly
reproduced. More particularly, the hiring rates of the age group 50-59 are
overestimated by the model. The job finding rate of this population decreases
more in the data than in the model. The model is more relevant to capturing
the more pronounced decline in the hiring rate when the retirement age is
imminent (between 60 and 64).
Overall, we consider that this simple model works quite well to generate
the age profile of hirings and separations over the life cycle. The sensitivity
of hiring and separation rates to the retirement horizon is quantitatively
significant.
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4.3 A first counterfactual experiment: the actual French
institutions
We simulate the same model calibrated using the same parameters as be-
fore, except that we consider the French labor market institutions7 at the
beginning of the 2000s:
• The unemployment replacement rate z is set to 0.35 (Figure 3).
• F is set according to the estimates of Garibaldi and Violante (2002):
the layoff tax would represent one third of the average annual earnings.
• The retirement age is set at 60.
The results of this counterfactual experiment are presented in Figure 7. On
Figure 7: Model Assessment: France - 2000
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the one hand, high EPL and UB introduce some delays in the increase of
7Note that that we have also introduced heterogeneity in the home production pa-
rameter b in order to match the employment and the job separation rate for the 35-49
age-group.
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younger worker employment: the employment rate predicted by the model for
the young workers in France is lower than in the US. This result is explained
by lower job flows for the 16-24 age-group in France than in the US: whereas
the hiring and firing rates are equal to 40% and 12% respectively in the
US, they fall to 30% and 9% in France. The lower rotation rate in France
implies that the employment rate of younger workers converges more slowly
toward the age-stationary employment rate. Quantitatively, this represents
approximatively an employment loss equal to 7 percentage points for the 16-
19 age-group and to 5 percentage points for the 20-25 age-group. On the other
hand, despite employment protection, the lower retirement age combined
with a high replacement rate in France leads firms to decrease hirings and
increase firings from 50 years old onward, whereas it only occurs from 55 in
the US. These results show that differences in both labor market institutions
and retirement ages can account for large employment rate differences at the
beginning and at the end of the life cycle (Figure 8). However, it must be
acknowledged that the differences observed for the younger workers are worse
in the data than in the model. Kitao, Ljungqvist and Sargent [2009] have
recently emphasized the negative role played in France by the minimum wage
regulation, especially for the younger workers. This is clearly a shortcoming
in our streamlined framework of not considering this labor market dimension.
Figure 8: Employment rates in France and the USA - 2000
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4.4 The French institutions in 1970
Empirical evidence presented in Bassanini and Duval (2006) supports the
idea that a sizable share of the cross-country unemployment changes between
1982 and 2003 can be explained by changes in the labor market and SS
institutions. In this section, we provide empirical support for this view.
We consider the French institutions in the 1970s, mostly keeping the US
institutions unchanged8.
• The retirement age is set at 63 in France and 65 in the US in 1970.
• In France, the average replacement rate is set at 0.25 and F is divided
by 3 in 1970. The LMI in the US are considered unchanged.
Figure 9: Employment rates in France and the USA - 2000/1970
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Figure 9 shows that the age-distribution of the employment rates is stable
over time in the US, except for the 60-64 age group which displays a small
8Note that we recalibrate the home production parameters in order to match the em-
ployment rates of the 25-49 age-group in the US and in France.
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decrease over this period. On the other hand, in France the age-distribution
of the employment rates is largely modified: between 1970 and 2000, we
observe a large decline in the employment rates of the younger and the older
workers, whereas the employment rate of the prime-age worker is stabler.
For the US, the change in the retirement age allows us to explain a large
part of the decline of the employment rate before this age. On the other
hand, in the French economy, the observed change in the institutions allows
us to explain an important part of the shift in the employment rates by age.
Indeed, for the young workers, the lower level of both the unemployment
benefits and the firing costs allows us to reproduce a higher employment rate
at the beginning of the life cycle, whereas the increase in the retirement age
increases the employment rates at the end of the life cycle. Nevertheless, our
results suggest that our model is not able to account for the large decline in
the employment of younger workers in France between 1970 and 2000. Again,
this can be explained by the absence of a minimum wage in our theoretical
framework: it was increased in France during this period and the younger
workers are the population the most likely to be working at the minimum
level.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we adopt a life-cycle view of the transatlantic labor market
performance. The facts tell us that the differences across countries are mostly
located at the two extremities of the working life cycle: for instance, France
experiences lower employment for both older and younger workers, whereas
its employment rate for the middle-age workers is pretty similar to that of
the US. Are there age-specific institutions or do labor market institutions
have an age-differentiated effect? Actually, both. On the one hand, the
retirement age as early as 60 in France automatically makes the employment
rate of the over-60 worker lower, but also the employment rate of the 50-and-
over age group by shortening their horizon and then decreasing the return
on search at the end of the working life. On the other hand, we show that
labor market institutions that decrease labor market rotations slow the entry
process into the labor market, which explains a proportion of the younger
23
worker unemployment in France, without any consequences on the middle-
aged worker employment.
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